EPA: An efficient and privacy-aware revocation mechanism for vehicular ad hoc networks by Hernández Gañan, Carlos et al.
EPA: an Ecient and Privacy-Aware revocation Mechanism for Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks
Carlos Ga~nana, Jose L. Mu~noza, Oscar Esparzaa, Jorge Mataa, Juanjo Alinsa
a Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya Departament Enginyeria Telematica
1-3 Jordi Girona, C3 08034 Barcelona (Spain)
Abstract
Security is vital for the reliable operation of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). One of the critical security
issues is the revocation of misbehaving vehicles. While essential, revocation checking can leak private information. In
particular, repositories receiving the certicate status queries could infer the identity of the vehicles posing the query
and the target of the query. An important loss of privacy results from this ability to tie the checking vehicle with
the query's target, due to their likely willingness to communicate. In this paper, we propose an Ecient and Privacy-
Aware revocation Mechanism (EPA) based on the use of Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) and a Crowds-based anonymous
protocol, which replaces the time-consuming certicate revocation lists checking process. EPA provides explicit, concise,
authenticated and unforgeable information about the revocation status of each certicate while preserving the users'
privacy. Moreover, EPA reduces the security overhead for certicate status checking, and enhances the availability and
usability of the revocation data. By conducting detailed performance evaluation, EPA is demonstrated to be reliable,
ecient, and scalable.
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1. Introduction
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) aim at enhanc-
ing safety and eciency in transportation systems. VA-
NETs consist of entities including On-Board Units (OBUs)
and infrastructure Road-Side Units (RSUs). Mobile nodes
are capable of communicating with each other (i.e., Vehicle
to Vehicle Communication -V2V communication) and with
the RSUs (i.e., Vehicle to Infrastructure Communication
-V2I communication). As any other wireless network, VA-
NETs can be vulnerable to attacks and jeopardize users'
privacy. For instance, an attacker could inject false infor-
mation, or collect vehicles' messages, track their locations,
and infer sensitive user data. To thwart such attacks, se-
curity and privacy enhancing mechanisms are necessary
or, in fact, a prerequisite for deployment. According to
the IEEE 1609.2 standard [1], vehicular networks will rely
on the public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, a certi-
cation authority issues an authentic digital certicate for
each node in the network. Due to misbehavior, intentional
or otherwise, certicates need to be revoked in order to
limit the risk that potential misuse poses to the rest of the
network. The IEEE 1609.2 standard [1] states that VA-
NETs will depend on certicate revocation lists (CRLs) to
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achieve revocation. CRLs are black lists that enumerate
revoked certicates along with the date of revocation and,
optionally, the reasons for revocation.
Unfortunately, the CRL size in VANETs is expected to
be large for the following reasons: (i) the scale of VANET
will be signicantly large. (ii) to preserve the privacy of
the drivers (i.e., to prevent the leakage of the real identities
and location information of the drivers from any external
eavesdropper) each OBU should be preloaded with a set
of anonymous digital certicates, where the OBU has to
periodically change its anonymous certicate to mislead
attackers. Consequently, a revocation of an OBU results
in revoking all the certicates carried by that OBU lead-
ing to a large increase in the CRL size [2, 3, 4]. Thus,
distributing and updating CRLs raise a challenge. Several
CRLs distribution protocols have been proposed to palliate
this pitfall, e.g., using compressed CRLs by using Bloom
lters [5]. Other proposals suggest the use of regional CAs
and short lived certicates to decrease the number of en-
tries in the CRL [6]. However, these works overlooked the
disruption nature of vehicular networks. Recently, some
work have appeared dealing with the distribution of cer-
ticate status information (CSI) in environments prone to
disruption [7, 8, 9, 10]. These mechanisms take advantage
of caching strategies combined with hashing techniques to
enhance the availability of the revocation service. Never-
theless, none of these approaches takes into account the
loss of privacy due to the CSI checking process.
Regardless of their particulars, current revocation meth-
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ods that dier from the traditional CRL approach have an
unpleasant side-eect: they divulge too much information
[11]. In particular, a non-trusted third party (e.g., a RSU)
could gain knowledge about who is talking to whom, by
just analyzing the CSI requests. This is signicant, be-
cause the revocation status check typically serves as a
prelude to actual communication between the two par-
ties. Hence, RSUs could acquire signicant statistics of
the PKI such as who sends a message to whom, how of-
ten, etc. Recently, there have appeared some works that
intend to provide privacy during the revocation process
[12, 13]. However, they mainly use CRLs to convey the
revocation information. Though CRLs prevent the user's
privacy, they consume too much bandwidth when trans-
mitted.
In this article, we address the issue of checking the sta-
tus of a certicate by exploiting the use of Merkle hash
trees (MHT) [14]. MHT have already been suggested as
means to provide an ecient revocation service ([9, 15]).
However, they were used in such a way that each time
a certicate had to be checked, users had to contact a
local repository to verify its validity. We propose an Ef-
cient and Privacy-Aware (EPA) revocation mechanism
that uses MHT to provide certicate no-invalidity proofs
(i.e., a proof that a given certicate is not revoked) that
each vehicle stores locally. Thus, EPA allows vehicles prov-
ing the no-invalidity of their certicates to other entities.
CAs will transmit an extended CRL to the RSUs that
will act as repositories. RSUs will construct a MHT from
the information contained in the CRL. Then, any vehi-
cle will be able download the corresponding certicates'
no-invalidity proofs. For enforcing anonymity in multi-
hop VANETs, vehicles using EPA do not contact directly
the RSU when updating the CSI. In contrast, they fol-
low a Crowds-like protocol [16] according to which each
user probabilistically decides to send a message directly to
a common receiver, or else to forward it to a peer, who
is asked to repeat the process. Our protocol diers from
the original Crowds in that, rst, it does take into ac-
count transmission losses, and secondly, it is specically
conceived for multi-hop VANETs, rather than for wired
networks.
EPA enjoys three main advantages over the traditional
revocation mechanisms: i) EPA saves dramatically on bit
transmissions and costs, i.e., vehicles do not have to down-
load the whole CRL, just positive proofs of their certi-
cates' no-invalidity; ii) EPA always provides a positive
statement about the no-invalidity status of each not-yet-
expired certicate; iii) EPA always allows a complete an-
swer to any possible query of a user to the RSU and with-
out trusting the latter in any special way. Thus, EPA
decreases the dependency on the infrastructure to provide
the certicate status checking service at the same time
that prevents RSUs to acquire any private information.
Once the vehicles have obtained these short proofs assert-
ing the no-invalidity of their certicates, they do not need
to contact the infrastructure anymore. To obtain and up-
date these proofs, vehicles contact RSUs without leaking
personal information. Therefore, EPA provides explicit,
concise, authenticated and unforgeable information about
the revocation status of each certicate while preserving
the users' privacy.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we summarize the related work regarding CSI man-
agement. Section 3 describes the Ecient and Privacy-
Aware (EPA) revocation mechanism. In Section 4 we eval-
uate and compare our proposal to other revocation mech-
anisms. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2. Background
In this section, we describe existing revocation propos-
als for VANET.
2.1. Privacy aware revocation approaches for VANET
The IEEE 1609.2 standard [1] proposes an architecture
based on the existence of a Trusted Third Party (TTP),
which manages the revocation service. In this architecture
each vehicle possesses several short-lived certicates (used
as pseudonyms), to ensure users' privacy. However, short-
lived certicates are not enough as compromised or faulty
vehicles could still endanger other vehicles until the end of
their certicate lifetimes. Thus, the IEEE 1609.2 promotes
the use of CRLs to manage revocation while assuming per-
vasive roadside architecture. CRLs provide privacy, as all
users ask for the same le and they check the certicate
status locally.
Raya et al. [17] propose the use of a tamper-proof de-
vice (TPD) to store the certicates. They investigated the
privacy issue by proposing a pseudonym based approach
using anonymous public keys and the PKI, where the pub-
lic key certicate is needed, giving rise to extra commu-
nication and storage overhead. Thus, when a vehicle is
compromised/misbehaving, it can be removed from the
network by just revoking the TPD. To ensure that mes-
sages from this OBU are not considered valid once the cer-
ticates have been revoked, revocation information must
also be distributed via CRLs. The authors also proposed
to use frequently updated anonymous public keys to fulll
users' requirement on identity and location privacy. To
reduce the bandwidth consumed by the transmission of
CRLs, these authors proposed to compress the CRLs by
using Bloom lters. However, this method gives rise to
false positives which degrades the reliability of the revoca-
tion service.
Authors in [18] proposed a distributed certicate-service
(DCS) scheme that introduced an aggregate batch veri-
cation technique for authenticating certicate-based signa-
tures, which signicantly decreased the verication over-
head. Using DCS vehicles can update their pseudonymous
certicate sets from the certicate issuer by V2I communi-
cation. Once each certicate has a short-time period and
is used in a specically geographic region, the CRL that
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broadcasted in a region can decrease. However, the CRL
size still depends on how many pseudonymous certicates
are held by the revoked vehicles
Other proposals are based on identity-based (ID-based)
signatures and group signatures to provide the revocation
service. Group signature-based schemes are proposed in
[19, 20, 21], where signer privacy is conditional on the
group manager. As a result, all these schemes have the
problem of identity escrow, as a group manager who pos-
sesses the group master key can arbitrarily reveal the iden-
tity of any group member. In addition, due to the limi-
tation of group formation in VANETs, the group-based
schemes [19, 21, 22] may not be applied appropriately. The
election of group leader will sometimes encounter dicul-
ties since a trusted entity cannot be found among peer
vehicles. In [19], group signatures for OBUs and identity-
based signatures for RSUs have been proposed in order to
maintain security and privacy. A message received from an
OBU can be veried by its signature; so that receiver can
determine whether that OBU is legitimate. However, cov-
erage of multi-hop routing is lacking in that proposal. On
the other hand in [20], authors proposed an ecient condi-
tional privacy preservation (ECPP) protocol to overcome
the limitation of pre-storing a large number of anonymous
certicates while preserving conditional privacy. Since a
vehicle should change anonymous certicate quite often
to avert tracing of messages, it should frequently interact
with RSUs. This short-lived anonymous certicate needs
to be sent and forwarded to veriers for validating mes-
sages from anonymous originator.
Regarding ID-based protocols, authors in [23] proposed
an ID-based security framework for VANETs to provide
authentication, nonrepudiation, and pseudonymity. How-
ever, their framework is limited by the strong dependence
on the infrastructure for short-lived pseudonym genera-
tion, which renders the signaling overhead overwhelming.
The proposed nonrepudiation scheme enables a single au-
thority to retrieve the identity which may raise the concern
on potential abuse. Authors in [24] adopted an identity-
based (ID-based) ring signature scheme to achieve signer
ambiguity and hence fulll the privacy requirement in VA-
NET applications. The main drawback of the ring signa-
ture scheme in the VANET context, is the unconditional
privacy, resulting in the traceability requirement unattain-
able.
Finally, some proposals in the literature divert from the
IEEE 1609.2 standard and use the Online Status Checking
Protocol (OCSP)[25]. OCSP is a request/response proto-
col between clients and responders. An OCSP responder is
a trusted intermediate authority for revocation data distri-
bution. Requests may or may not be signed by the client
but all the responses must be signed so that clients can
ensure that they are communicating with an authorized
OCSP responder. In VANET, there is a proposal called
ADOPT (Ad-hoc Distributed OCSP for Trust) [26] that
provides a revocation service based on OCSP in a decen-
tralized manner. ADOPT uses cached OCSP responses
that are distributed and stored on intermediate nodes in
the VANET.
3. EPA: Ecient and Privacy-Aware revocation
Mechanism
3.1. Overview
EPA's main idea relies on the use of positive proofs of
the certicate's no-invalidity instead of forcing vehicles to
download huge revocation lists. A no-invalidity proof gives
evidences that a given certicate has not been revoked.
These proofs are obtained from a Merkle hash tree (MHT)
that is constructed from the list of revoked certicates. A
Merkle hash tree (MHT) [14] is essentially a tree structure
that is built with a One Way Hash Function (OWHF).
The leaf nodes hold the hash values of the data of inter-
est (data1,data2,...) and the internal nodes hold the hash
values that result from applying the OWHF to the con-
catenation of the hash values of its children nodes. In this
way, a large number of separate data can be tied to a single
hash value: the hash at the root node of the tree. MHTs
can be used to provide an ecient and highly-scalable way
to distribute revocation information. This MHT allows the
CA to accumulate the set of revoked pseudonyms into a
single value (root of the MHT) so that RSUs can eciently
compute proofs that demonstrate that a certicate has not
been accumulated, i.e., a proof that a certicate is not re-
voked. The CAs will be in charge of managing the root
value of the MHT and the CRLs that are only transmitted
to the RSUs. By using the root value, any network entity
will be able to check the validity of a given certicate once
they obtain the corresponding no-invalidity proof. To pre-
vent RSUs from gaining knowledge about the statistics of
the PKI (i.e., who sends a message to whom, how often,
etc.), each vehicle will be in charge of managing the va-
lidity proofs of the certicates they own. Vehicles contact
the RSUs when they need to update their proofs and/or
the root value. Hence, vehicles' privacy is preserved as
they do not disclose any information when updating the
revocation data.
Figure 1: EPA phases overview
Basically, EPA consists in 4 dierent phases (see g. 1):
1. Initialization: The CA appends the identier of any
revoked certicate into a CRL. From this list, the
CA calculates the root of the MHT where each leaf
of the tree represents a revoked certicate. This root
is signed and appended to the CRL as an extension.
The extended CRL is communicated to the RSUs via
a secure wireline.
2. Repositories creation: RSUs reconstruct the MHT
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from the extended-CRL1. Once the MHT is con-
structed they can answer to any certicate status
query and provide the corresponding no-invalidity
proof.
3. Certicate status testing : Vehicles detect any entity
in range and randomly choose a candidate to forward
the no-invalidity proof query for a given certicate.
In turn, the chosen candidate randomly chooses an-
other candidate and forwards the query. This proto-
col runs until the RSU is reached and replies with the
signed root value and the corresponding certicate's
no-invalidity proof. Upon request from any other
entity, the vehicle has to provide them with the ap-
propriate proof. The checking entity must perform
the no-invalidity test which consists in checking that
the certicate does not belong to the MHT.
4. Revocation data updating : According to its certi-
cate practice statement, the CA must issue a new
extended-CRL periodically. These data will be trans-
mitted to the RSUs, which in turn will transmit the
new root value and the corresponding no-invalidity
proofs to the vehicles.
3.2. Security Architecture
In this section we explain the security architecture nec-
essary to support EPA and describe the details of each
phase.
extended-CRL
extended-CRL
extended-CRL
Figure 2: System Architecture.
The security architecture is an adaptation of a hierar-
chical PKI system to a vehicular scenario. This architec-
ture consist of 3 dierent types of entities (see Fig. 2):
1Note that vehicles could also act as mobile repositories. However,
downloading the extended-CRL will be time consuming and costly,
and assuming that kind of connectivity to the infrastructure is not
realistic in such disruption-prone networks.
1. Certication Authorities: CAs are responsible for
holding and managing the credentials and identi-
ties of all the vehicles which are registered under its
hood. CAs are responsible for generating the set of
pseudonyms that are stored in each OBU. They are
also responsible for managing the revocation infor-
mation and making it accessible to the rest of the
entities. By denition of TTP, the CA should be
considered fully trusted by all the network entities.
2. Road-Side Units: RSUs are xed entities that are
fully controlled by the CA. They can access the CA
anytime via wireline, which does not suer from dis-
connections. If the CA considers that an RSU has
been compromised, the CA can revoke it. RSUs will
act as repositories of the CSI.
3. Vehicles: They are the clients of the network. They
have their cryptographic material stored in a tamper-
proof device (TPD). Vehicles access the RSU using
the IEEE 802.11p.
3.3. EPA Tree
In this section, we introduce the data structure that
EPA uses to handle the revocation service. In this sense,
we dene the EPA tree as a particular case of Merkle Hash
Tree. The EPA tree is a binary hash tree where each node
represents a revoked certicate.
We denote by Ni;j the nodes within the EPA tree,
where i; j 2 f0; 1; 2:::g represent respectively the i-th level
and the j-th node in the i-th level. We denote by Hi;j the
cryptographic (hash) value stored by node Ni;j .
20 10 11( | )rootH H h H H= =
010 0 01( | )H H Hh=
000 ( )hH ID= 101 ( )hH ID= 202 ( )hH ID= 303 ( )hH ID=
11N10N
011 2 03( | )H H Hh=
00N 01N 02N 03N
20N
0min ID=
1max ID=
0min ID=
0max ID=
1min ID=
1max ID=
2min ID=
3max ID=
2min ID=
2max ID=
3min ID=
3max ID=
0min ID=
3max ID=
Figure 3: Sample EPA Tree.
Nodes at level 0 are called \leaves\ and they represent
the data stored in the tree. In the case of revocation,
leaves represent the set  of certicates that are revoked
at a given instant t,
t = fID0; ID1; : : : ; IDj; : : : ; IDng : (1)
According to the IEEE 1609.2 Standard [1] a revoked
certicate is identied in a CRL by its hash. The CertID8
and CertID10 types are used to identify a certicate. The
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CertIDX for a given certicate, where X is 8 or 10, shall be
calculated by calculating the SHA-256 hash of the certi-
cate and taking the low-order X bytes of the hash output.
Let IDj be the low-order 10 bytes of the hash output of a
revoked certicate. If the IDj is stored at leaf N0;j , then
H0;j is computed as:
H0;j = h(IDj) ; (2)
where h() corresponds to the OWHF function.
Leaves are ordered in the following way: leaves on the
left represent smaller ID than leaves on the right. Each
node also stores the minimum and maximum ID of its
children. If a leaf has no children, then it uses its own ID
for the maximum and minimum values.
To build the EPA tree, two adjacent nodes at a given
level i (Ni;j , Ni;j+1) are combined into one node in the
upper level, which we denote by Ni+1;k. Then, Hi+1;k is
obtained by applying h to the concatenation of the two
cryptographic values:
Hi+1;k = h(Hi;j jHi;j+1): (3)
At the top level there is only one node called the \root\.
Hroot is a digest for all the data stored in the EPA tree.
Figure 3 shows a sample EPA tree.
Denition 1. Let the Digest be the concatenation of the
certication authority distinguished number DNCA, the root
hash Hroot and the validity period of the CRL. Once cre-
ated, the Digest is signed by the CA.
Digest = fDNCA;Hroot; V alidityPeriodgSIGCA : (4)
Denition 2. Let the PathIDj be the set of cryptographic
values necessary to compute Hroot from the leaf IDj.
Note that the Digest is trusted because it is signed
by the CA and it is unique within the tree. Meanwhile,
Paths are dierent for each leaf. An end Entity can verify
whether IDj 2  if the MHT provides a response with the
proper PathIDj and the Digest of the MHT. For instance,
let us suppose that a certain user wants to nd out whether
ID1 belongs to the sample EPA tree of Figure 3. Then,
PathID1 = fH0;0;H1;1g;
Digest = fDNCA; H2;0; V alidityPeriodgSIGCA :
The response verication consists in checking that H2;0
computed from the PathID1 , h(h(h(ID1)jH0;0)jH1;1)
matches the cryptographic value H2;0 = Hroot included in
the Digest:
Hroot = H2;0 = h(h(h(ID1)jH0;0)jH1;1) : (5)
Note that the EPA tree can be built by a Trusted
Third Party (e.g., a CA) and freely distributed to un-
trusted repositories. The EPA tree cannot be forged, that
is, any change in the tree made by a non-TTP will be de-
tected. This is due to any modication in the EPA tree
(for instance, the addition or deletion of a leaf node) causes
Hroot to change. As Hroot is included in the Digest, which
is signed by the CA, this modication will cause the sig-
nature to be invalid. To perform a successful attack, the
attacker would need to nd a pre-image of an OWHF,
which is computationally unfeasible by denition.
3.4. EPA's Operating Mode
3.4.1. Assumptions and threat model
We will make the following assumptions about the ve-
hicular network.
 The links between vehicles and RSUs are always bi-
directional.
 Vehicles and RSUS have a half-duplex constraint,
i.e., they cannot simultaneously transmit and receive
a message .
 An RSU is not always within the communication
range of every user.
 Every wireless node has enough computation power
to execute encryption and decryption algorithm.
 There is a trusted certicate authority (CA) outside
the ad hoc network, which issues public key and pri-
vate key to the wireless nodes inside the network.
 Each wireless node holds only one IP address for its
communication in the ad hoc network, by which it
will be recognized by all other wireless nodes.
 There are some nodes that are not willing to coop-
erate for routing and data delivering and possibly
actively intent to tamper the routing protocol.
 Nodes cannot impersonate several identities at the
same time. That is, we assume that there are Sybil
detection and localization mechanisms that are al-
ready deployed (e.g., [27, 28, 29]).
On the other hand, we consider the threat posed by
an adversary who wishes to ascertain the identity of the
originator of the CSI requests. In our scenario, it is the
RSU who plays the role of the privacy attacker. The users
involved in the multi-hop routing protocol, however, are
assumed to be partially trusted. We also assume that the
attacker strives to guess the identity of the rst sender
(originator) of a the CSI request, knowing only the user
who last forwarded it. From all this information, the RSU
may estimate the most likely identity of the CSI requester,
although with limited certainty. This could be interpreted
as an adversary with a local view of the network, possibly
due to their limited coverage range.
The immediate goal is to identify the identity of the
sender of a non-invalidity proof request. Ultimate pur-
poses include proling of user interests and behavior in-
ferred from statistically matching the contents of queries
with sender identities, and violation of anonymity in sen-
sitive reporting.
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3.4.2. System Initialization
During the initialization, the CA creates all the nec-
essary cryptographic material to provide the authentica-
tion and the revocation service. In this rst stage, the
CA creates the extended-CRL and delivers it to the RSUs.
An extended-CRL is basically a standard CRL with an
appended extension. This extension can be used by non-
trusted entities (RSUs and vehicles inside the VANET) to
act as repositories and answer to certicate status requests.
All the tasks of this system initialization are performed in
the CA locally, so the computational delay is not suered
by the other network entities.
The CA initializes the system by executing Algorithm 1.
Note that we assume that all vehicles are equipped with a
tamper-proof device (TPD).
Algorithm 1: System initialization
Select a generator P 2 G1 of prime order p1
Select a master secret key skCA 2 Zp2
Set the corresponding public key pkCA = skCA  P3
Given the set of n elements4
R = fID1; ID2; : : : ; IDng of revoked certicates,
create the CRL including all the elements
Compute the MHT as explained in Sec. 3.35
Compute and sign the Digest from the MHT's root.6
Append the Digest to the CRL and sign it7
forall OBUk, CA do8
Generate a set of anonymous certicates ()9
pseudk = fcertki (IDki ; PKki ); sigCA(IDki jjPKki ))j1 
i  g
Upload pseudk in TPDk of OBUk10
Convey the extended-CRL to the RSUs, and11
publicize the Digest to all the OBUs
It should be noted that in step (1), PKi denotes the
ith public key for OBUk , where the corresponding secret
key is SKi; IDi denotes the ith pseudonym for OBUk,
where the CA is the only entity that can relate IDi to the
real identity of OBUk; and  is the number of pseudonyms
loaded in each OBU. After this rst stage of System Initial-
ization, the RSUs have a copy of the extended-CRL, which
contains exactly the same CSI than a standard CRL and it
is valid for the same time. The advantage of an extended-
CRL is that any non-trusted entity in possession of it can
generate again the EPA tree locally, and obtain the root
hash. As the extended-CRL also includes the Digest, which
is signed by the CA, this entity has an authenticated ver-
sion of the EPA tree and can answer to CSI requests in an
o-line way.
3.4.3. Repositories Creation
After the initialization phase, any vehicle possesses a
set of pseudonyms to preserve their privacy. They can
obtain the Digest from any RSU in range. To become a
repository an entity must follow the next steps:
1. The entity obtains the extended-CRL either from the
CA or from another entity that has an up-to-date
copy of the extended-CRL in its cache. Notice that
the CA uses a secure wireline to communicate with
the RSUs, while the RSUs use a wireless link to com-
municate with the vehicles.
2. Once the extended-CRL has been downloaded, the
entity veries that the signature of the extended-CRL
is valid and corresponds to the CA. If so, the en-
tity generates locally the EPA tree using the serial
numbers within the extended-CRL and following the
same algorithm than the CA (as explained in Sec-
tion 3.3). The root hash of the tree created from the
extended-CRL entries must match the signed root
value contained in the Digest.
3. At this moment, the entity can create any certicate
no-invalidity proof until the extended-CRL expires.
3.4.4. Certicate Status Testing
After the second stage, RSUs will be able to act as
repositories. The last stage of the mechanism consists in
providing the certicate status information to any vehi-
cle that needs to obtain a no-invalidity proof of their cer-
ticates. The protocol for status information exchange is
based on the hash tree structure and it allows checking the
integrity of a single extended-CRL entry with only some
hash material plus the Digest (included in the extension).
On the one hand, this is much more ecient than broad-
casting the entire extended-CRL. On the other hand, the
mechanism is fully oine (the only trusted authority is
the CA), which is a very good feature because sometimes
it may be impossible for vehicles to reach the CA due to
lack of coverage.
However, if a vehicle forwards directly the no-invalidity
proof requests to the RSU, it could be easily tracked as
the RSU will know which pseudonyms corresponds to the
requesting vehicle. To avoid this traceability, EPA uses an
anonymity protocol based on Crowds [16].
A. EPA's probabilitic routing
EPA builds on top of a generic multi-hop routing pro-
tocol. The selection of this protocol will determine the
performance of our approach, both in terms of QoS and
user anonymity. EPA is deployed on top of this routing
protocol, and operating at the application layer.
To exemplify EPA's performance, we deployed our mech-
anism over the adaptive Secure Ad hoc On-demand Dis-
tance Vector (A-SAODV) routing protocol [30, 31]. e use
A-SAODV in its unicast version where routing decisions
are made using distance vectors. Note that the number of
participants basically depends on AODV, the forwarding
probability p and the maximum delay of the query. Each
non-validity proof request is sent in a dierent message and
thus a dierent path. Each node handling a CSI request
gives a probability p to the shortest path determined by
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the A-SAODV protocol to the closest RSU, whereas the
probability to choose another path is then 1   p. Thus,
each of the N  1 neighbor vehicles will have a probability
of 1 pN 1 of being selected as the next forwarding node.
Figure 4: Fordwaring routing protocol
Algorithm 2: Probabilistic routing protocol
Input: SourceID, RSU , timestamp
Output: NextHopNodeID
if CurrentNodeID != RSU then1
SourceID  CurrentNodeID2
Find shortest path P to RSU using A-SAODV3
if timestamp < maxDelay then4
if rand()  p then5
NextHopNodeID  Next node in P6
else7
NextHopNodeID  Any other neighbor8
else9
NextHopNodeID  Next node in P10
Figure 4 shows an example of this anonymous proto-
col. In this example, a vehicle to validate three of its
pseudonyms (i.e., pseuda, pseudb and pseudc) forwards
three no-invalidity proof requests to the RSU following
three dierent paths. In this case, the shortest direct path
to the RSU using AODV is only used for pseudc. Note
that EPA does not necessarily use the same path to get
the non-invalidity proofs for the same vehicle.
As described in Alg. [? ], to limit the packet delay
that can be induced by potential loops, we use a timeout
that will bound the maximum delay. Once this timeout
is reached, the vehicle that is currently managing the CSI
request will send the message directly to the RSU in range.
This timeout is based on the timeout algorithm dened in
[32] which takes into account the transmission range and
the vehicles velocity.
To forward the non-invalidity proof to the requesting
vehicle, it is necessary to establish a backward path. EPA
follows the same strategy that the original Crowds mech-
anism,i.e., to add a path id eld to determine a node in
a path. The path id eld constitutes an overhead of 128
bits [16].
Taking advantage of the RERRmessage dened in AODV,
it is possible to notify that a breakage in the path has oc-
curred and some reply messages will be lost. Of course as
the identity of the sender remains anonymous, is only pos-
sible repair the path toward destination. In other words
the reply mechanism is intermediate node presence depen-
dent.
B. Obtaining non-invalidity proofs
To obtain the non-validity proofs of its pseudonyms a ve-
hicle must follow the protocol described in Algorithm 3.
Contrary to traditional certicate status checking mecha-
nisms, vehicles do not need neither to download the whole
CRL nor to disclose the ID of the certicate they need to
check. Note that in each update the OBU has to choose k
pseudonyms from the set of valid pseudonyms it has pre-
viously stored in its TPD. Once k pseudonyms are chosen,
the vehicle must obtain the corresponding no-invalidity
proof following the aforementioned protocol. Thus, the ve-
hicle just obtains the right amount of no-invalidity proofs
it will need during the lifetime of the Digest. Haas, Hu,
and Laberteaux in [6] recommend changing pseudonyms
every 10 minutes while driving 2 hours per day. Tradi-
tionally, new updates of the CSI are published each 24
hours, so this means downloading 12 validity proofs every
day. Note that the size of tens of validity proofs is still
much lower than the size of the CRL that contains thou-
sands of revoked certicates. Therefore, EPA not only
improves the privacy of the users but also the bandwidth
costs required to check the validity of any certicate.
Algorithm 3: Obtaining the Certicates' No-
invalidity Proofs
Input: Set of pseudonyms ()
Output: No-invalidity Proofs
if Digest not cached or Expired Validity Period in1
Digest or not valid signature then
Download Digest from any repository in range.2
else3
Randomly select k pseudonyms from the set 4
forall Selected pseudi do5
Hash the pseudi and take the low-order 106
bytes of each hash output.
Obtain the corresponding Paths from the7
RSU (using the aforementioned anonymous
protocol)
Verify that the Hroot calculated from the8
Paths matches the Hroot contained in the
Digest.
return Set of Paths (No-invalidity proofs)9
First of all, the OBU must check that each Path in-
cluded in the response is correct, that is, that the rootHash
computed from the Path matches the rootHash included
in the Digest. However, it is worth noting that testing the
validity of a path is not enough if a target certicate has
not been revoked. Additionally, the OBU also needs to en-
sure that the Paths provided belong to real adjacent nodes
(remember that the repository is a non-TTP, so the user
can be misled into believing that a certain pair of nodes
within the tree are adjacent leaves).
Notice that as the Hroot is signed by the CA, it is just
as impractical to create falsied values of the Path as it
7
Algorithm 4: Algorithm to calculate the Path of a
given certicate.
Input: SNtarget
Output: Path
Nij = root;1
while Nij :max 6= Nij :min do2
i = i  13
j = 2  j4
if Nij :max < SNtarget then5
Path.add(Nij)6
j = j + 17
else8
Path.add(Ni;j+1)9
return Path10
is to break a strong hash function. In case the certicate
is not revoked, the repository sends the adjacent leaves to
the requested certicate. In this respect, the repository
has to prove that a certain certicate (IDtarget) does not
belong to the set of revoked certicates (). Recall that
IDj denotes the low-order 10 bytes of the hash output
of a revoked certicate. To prove that IDtarget =2 , as
the leaves are ordered, it is enough to demonstrate the
existence of two leaves, a minor adjacent (IDminor) and a
major adjacent (IDmajor) that fulll:
1. IDmajor 2 .
2. IDminor 2 .
3. IDminor < IDtarget < IDmajor.
4. IDminor and IDmajor are adjacent nodes.
Next, we describe a recursive algorithm that given a
certain couple of Paths , veries whether they actually
belong to \real" adjacent leaves. The algorithm works
without adding any extra information to the protocol or
the data structures. The alleged adjacent leaves are de-
noted by N0;j and N0;j+1.
It must be pointed that the strength of the above algo-
rithm resides in the position that a certain node occupies
relative to its father, in other words whether a certain node
is LEFT or RIGHT. Notice that the end user can trust
this information since the relative node positions cannot
be swapped by a malicious repository because we use a
non-commutative hash function. If the malicious reposi-
tory modies the concatenation order, then it changes the
cryptographic value of the next step (6)
Hi+1;k = h(Hi;j jHi;j+1) 6= h(Hi;j+1jHi;j) : (6)
After executing Algorithm 3, the vehicle has the no-
invalidity proofs necessary to demonstrate to any other
entity that the pseudonyms it is using are valid. When a
vehicle needs verifying the validity of a given pseudonym
it must:
Algorithm 5: Algorithm to test the adjacency of two
nodes from their Paths.
Input: Conresponding Paths for N0;j and N0;j+1
Output: Adjacent
i = 01
while Common father between N0;j and N0;j+1 is2
not found do
Calculate Hi+1;m Hi+1;n, i.e., cryptographic3
values of the fathers of Ni;j and Ni;j+1.
if Ni;j = Ni+1;m:left and4
Ni;j+1 = Ni+1;m:right then
Adjacent = TRUE5
break6
else7
Adjacent = FALSE8
break9
if Ni;j 6= Ni+1;m:right then10
Adjacent = FALSE11
break12
else if Ni;j+1 6= Ni+1;n:left then13
Adjacent = FALSE14
break15
else16
i=i+117
height 0.4pt depth 0pt width .5em
return Adjacent
1. Obtain the no-invalidity proof from the correspond-
ing vehicle, i.e., the Paths of the corresponding IDminor
and IDmajor.
2. Obtain the hash of the pseudonym and take the low-
order 10 bytes.
3. Verify that the value of these 10 bytes is between
IDminor and IDmajor and that IDminor and IDmajor
are adjacent nodes.
4. Verify that theHroot calculated from the correspond-
ing Paths matches theHroot contained in the Digest.
Note that sending a new request for a proof of non-
invalidity for the same pseudonym does not necessarily
lead to a loss of anonymity. The requesting vehicle could
be traced only in the case that it sends the same request to
the same RSU and its neighbors are completely dierent
from the rst time it sent the same request. Thus, CSI
updating policies must be programmed at the OBU so
that this situation is avoided. These policies include:
1. Requesting non-validity proofs only when several ve-
hicles are under the coverage of the target repository.
2. Do not request non-validity proofs to a repository
that already has provided these proofs for the same
pseudonyms previously.
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If these rules are enforced, OBUs could update non-validity
proofs even when they have already used those pseudonyms.
3.5. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the security of the pro-
posed scheme in terms of message authentication and in-
tegrity, nonrepudiation, and privacy preserving.
1. Privacy preserving. EPA avoids that private infor-
mation could be disclosed during the revocation pro-
cess. When obtaining/updating the pseudonyms'
no-invalidity proofs, vehicles use an anonymous pro-
tocol so that the repositories cannot link the query
with the identity of the originator. Thus, vehicles
just ask for the status of their own certicates.
2. Mis-authentication Resistance: In the proposed scheme,
each entity should provide the no-invalidity of the
pseudonym it is using. This proof is directly linked
with the signed-root value of the MHT. Therefore,
if the hash of pseudonym lies in one of the leaves of
the MHT, the message will be dropped.
3. Non-repudiation. Based on the signature enclosed in
the Digest, vehicles can reveal the identity of the CSI
issuer, while the issuer cannot deny that the message
was generated by itself.
4. Replay attack resilience: Consider an adversary A
whose certicate ri has been revoked. Since the
Digest issued by the CA includes the current time
stamp Ti, A cannot use a validity proof valid at time
Ti and replay it at a later time Ti+1 to pass the revo-
cation checking process as the receiving OBU com-
pares the current time Ti+1 with that included in the
current Digest. Consequently, EPA is secure against
replay attacks.
4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the eciency of EPA and
we compare it with other certicates status management
protocols designed for VANET.
4.1. Analytical Evaluation
4.1.1. Storage Overhead of Vehicles
In our scheme, the pseudonym set costs storage space
in vehicles. Through a requesting process, a vehicle gets
n pseudonyms and k validity proofs with k < n. Let Scert
denote the size of a certicate, and Sproof denote the size
of a no-invalidity proof. The size of the certicates is xed
while the size of the proof basically depends on the height
of the MHT that in turn depends on the number of revoked
certicates. Then, the storage for pseudonyms and their
validity proofs is:
Stor = n Scert + k  Sproof
According to 1609.2 standard [1], we employ ECDSA as
the basic signature algorithm [33], so that Scert = 200 Bytes.
According to NIST statistics [34] 10% of the certicates
need to be revoked during a year and assuming that a re-
gional certication authority could manage around 50,000
vehicles, the size of the proof will be of around 700 Bytes.
Then, Stor  109 MBytes. This storage is aordable for
today's devices.
4.1.2. Revocation Overhead
Updated revocation data must be available to any ve-
hicle. In EPA, vehicles just need to download the Digest
and the corresponding no-invalidity proofs, while current
proposals such as DCS [18] and ECPP [20] need to down-
load the whole CRL. Table 1 presents the CRL size to
revoke one vehicle.
Mechanism Unit size Item number Total size (bytes)
Std 1609.2[1] 21 bytes
Lw + 1
2
10.5*(Lw + 1)
DCS [18] 8 bytes
Lw + 1
2
4*(Lw + 1)
ECPP [20] 21 bytes
Lw + 1
2
10.5*(Lw + 1)
ADOPT [7] 586 bytes 1 586
EPA 710 bytes 1 710
Table 1: Comparison of the overhead introduced by EPA and other
certicate validation mechanisms.
In ECPP, and DCS, all the pseudonyms of unexpired
certicates belonging to the revoked vehicle should be added
into the CRL. If the maximal size of the short-time pseudony-
mous certicate set in both ECPP and DCS is Lw, the av-
erage number of unexpired certicates is (Lw + 1)=2. On
the other hand in EPA, the new revoked pseudonyms just
have to be added to the Digest. To update the revoca-
tion data, vehicles just have to download this Digest and
k validity proofs. Thus, the size of the data to update
the revocation information in EPA is lower than in DCS
or ECPP as it does not grow linearly with the number of
revoked certicates. Note that EPA introduces the second
lowest total overhead in the network when downloading
the revocation data. It is only improved by ADOPT that
is an online revocation mechanism that assumes the con-
tinuous availability of the revocation infrastructure.
4.1.3. Privacy and traceability
The basic idea behind EPA is very simple: instead of
querying by a specic certicate serial number that be-
longs to another vehicle, the current vehicle queries sev-
eral serial numbers k where k is the cardinal of a subset
of its pseudonyms. Thus, EPA achieves to eectively hide
the identity of the vehicle they want to communicate with.
The only data divulged to the RSU (third party) are the
k pseudonyms that belong to a single vehicle. However, as
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EPA takes advantage of an anonymous forwarding proto-
col to obtain the no-invalidity proof, a compromised RSU
cannot track the identity of a vehicle. Hence the tracking
capabilities of a compromised RSU remain the same that
any other entity.
On the other hand, the schemes that adopt RSU-aided
revocation mechanisms such as DCS and ECPP cannot
achieve conditional anonymity against the RSUs. For in-
stance, in ECPP, a vehicle validates the status of its certi-
cates from an RSU by its invariable credential. Therefore,
when the service records stored in an RSU are leaked, the
adversary can nd out all the certicates that the RSU
has issued for the interested vehicle. In DCS, a vehicle
obtains the RSU service by a pseudonymous certicate is-
sued by the other RSUs. This way, the adversary does not
know which vehicle requests the service, but it can corre-
late the pseudonymous certicates belonging to the same
vehicle. Here, we develop a probabilistic model to analyze
the risk that the knowledge of an RSU is used to track an
interested vehicle.
Suppose there is a compromised RSU, and  vehicles
in a certain region. This compromised RSU gathers some
trac routine messages during  time slots and tries to
analyze the mobile route of an interested vehicle. In each
time slot, the RSU has recorded the certicates used by
these vehicles. Let Pr() denote the probability that the
RSU distinguishes the pseudonymous of the interested ve-
hicle from  candidate certicates, where Pr() = 1 . If
the RSU can correlate  certicates of the interested ve-
hicle, the tracing analysis succeeds. Let Psucc denote the
success traceability probability. When the RSU is in se-
cure state, the adversary has to nd out every certicate
of the interested vehicle from  certicates at each time
slot. Therefore, Psucc =
1
 . In EPA, when the RSU
is compromised, the adversary can get no useful informa-
tion; thus, PEPAsucc =
1
 . In ECPP, the adversary can
directly nd out the pseudonymous certicates of the in-
terested vehicle; thus, PECPPsucc = 1. In DCS, the adversary
has to conrm just one certicate of the interested vehi-
cle; thus, PDCSsucc =
1
 . I we set the number of time slots
that the compromised RSU can monitor equal to ten (i.e.,
 = 10), Fig. 5 plots the success traceability probability
versus number of vehicles in the region. It can be seen
that EPA provides the best privacy preservation.
Figure 5: Success traceability probability when the RSU is compro-
mised
Finally, note that EPA not only prevents the tracking
of any vehicle during the revocation service, but also pre-
vents that a compromised RSU could know who is com-
municating with who. Let us dene achievable privacy
as the probability of guessing the target certicate. On-
line certicate status checking mechanisms such as OCSP
or ADOPT have an achievable privacy equal to 1, i.e.,
a compromised RSU can exactly know who are the enti-
ties involved in any communication. On the other hand,
other approaches such as CRL, DCS and ECPP obtain the
maximum achievable privacy. Similarly, EPA also achieves
the same level of privacy than the CRL-based mechanisms.
Thus, while EPA requires less revocation overhead, it reaches
the same level of privacy than traditional revocation mech-
anisms.
4.1.4. Certicate Status Checking Delay
We compare the message status validation delay em-
ploying the IEEE 1609.2, ECPP, DCS and ADOPT with
that employing EPA to check the revocation status of an
OBU. This delay corresponds to amount of time necessary
to check the validity of a given certicate once the revo-
cation data has been retrieved. The IEEE 1609.2 trial use
standard proposes the use of CRL to check the status of
a certicate. To check the validity of certicate against
the CRL, a progressive search of the revoked certicates is
performed. Let Thash and Tmul denote the time required
to perform a hash operation and a point multiplication, re-
spectively. The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm is
the digital signature method chosen by the VANET stan-
dard IEEE1609.2, where a signature generation takes Tmul
and a signature verication takes 4Tmul. In EPA, to ver-
ify a credential, a verier must perform hash operations to
compute the current contents of the leaf node correspond-
ing to the target vehicle's identier. Therefore, the total
computation overhead when checking the status of a cer-
ticate is Thash(logN +1)+ 4Tmul. In [35], Tmul is found
for an MNT curve with embedding degree k = 6 that is
equal to 0.6 ms. In our simulation, we use the results of
for real tamper-proof devices [36]. Note that these results
were obtained using a PC machine Pentium III 800MHz
with 256MB RAM. According to these results, the maxi-
mum performance that Pentium III can achieve for SHA-1
hashes is 2.52 ops/cycles.
Figure 6 shows a comparison between the verication
delay per message using dierent certicate status check-
ing mechanisms vs. the number of the revoked certicates.
It can be seen that the delay using the CRL checking
process increases with the number of revoked certicates.
ECPP and DCS present similar delays to the ones obtained
with the traditional CRL. With EPA the delay also in-
creases but in a logarithmic manner. On the other hand,
this delay remains almost constant when using ADOPT
and EPA. ADOPT performs slightly better than EPA as
it only requires to check the correctness of a signature and
the freshness of a timestamp, while EPA also requires to
check the Digest. However, the main delay in ADOPT is
not due to the verication process but to the location of a
valid pre-signed response.
4.2. Simulation
In this section, we use the OMNeT++ network simu-
lator [37] and its INET Framework [38] extension to eval-
uate the performance of EPA. OMNeT++ is a well-known
discrete event simulator based on C++ which oers excel-
lent capabilities for protocol and network modeling. The
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Figure 6: Verication Delay
INET Framework [38] is a collection of protocols for the
use with OMNeT++ which, among others, contains imple-
mentations of IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP and several applica-
tion models as well as link-layer models of PPP, Ethernet
and 802.11. Especially its sophisticated implementation
of 802.11 Medium Access Control (MAC) and MAC Layer
Management makes the INET Framework a good choice
for the simulation of 802.11p-based car-to-x communica-
tion.
We use the trac simulator SUMO (Simulation of Ur-
ban MObility) [39] in order to generate our mobility mod-
els. In order to have a basis for the analysis's of EPA, a
realistic scenario was developed. The scenario comprises
an urban area of 90km2 of the Spanish city of Barcelona.
RSUs are placed every 1,500 meters covering the whole
city, similar to an access point in traditional wireless ad
hoc networks to provide necessary infrastructure support
for network setup and communications. In Fig. 7 the sce-
nario is depicted, which shows that residential zones, small
industrial areas and also parks with vegetation are existent
in the scenario. A typical residential zone with many small
side roads is located in the south-eastern part of the city.
Throughout the simulation area, there are major roads and
in the north-west as well as in the north-east of the area
there are two major trac junctions. Dierent streets like
one-way and two-way streets with a dierent number of
lanes as well as dierent speed limits of 30 or 80 km/h are
included.
The main parameter settings used in the simulations
are listed in Table 2. Note that we have congured our
simulation to use the Nakagami propagation model. We
choose this propagation model because empirical research
Figure 7: City of Barcelona. Data converted from OpenStreetMap
format to SUMO format.
studies have shown that a fading radio propagation model,
such as the Nakagami model, is best for simulation of a
vehicular environment [40].
Parameter Value
Area 90 km2
Number of RSUs 20
RSU Transmission power 28.8dBm
MAC IEEE 802.11p
Propagation model Nakagami
Transport protocol UDP
Table 2: Parameter values for the reference scenario.
The transmitter and receiver powers of the OBUs were
dened in the IEEE WAVE family of standards, so as re-
ceivers they have a sensitivity of -82.0 dBm (see Table 3).
The MAC retransmission policies for unicast messages are
the default. We use the 802.11 short retry limit of 7 re-
transmissions before it gives up on transmitting a given
message. If the message is not transmitted after 7 retries
it is dropped and it is the responsibility of the executing
application to ensure that it resends the message if that
is still needed. We generate network trac using greedy
UDP. By "greedy" we mean that the source node of a ow
will transmit data as many as it can. In our simulation
scenario, each RSU sets up a greedy UDP ow to each ve-
hicle. Recall that UDP is a transportation layer protocol
that simply transmits data down to the MAC-layer; thus,
the throughput obtained by all greedy UDP ows of all
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the vehicles are equivalent to the MAC-layer throughput
that can be obtained by the nodes minus the bandwidth
overheads introduced by MAC-layer, network-layer, and
transport-layer headers. For convenience, we use aggre-
gate UDP throughput to evaluate the 802.11(p) protocol.
Since the revocation data are deemed to be very important
for the robustness of the network, they are sent with the
maximum priority, which corresponds to access category
3. The conguration parameters of the vehicles are shown
in Table 3) .
Parameter Value
Speed f10,12,14,16,18,20g m/s
Max. Acceleration 5 m/s
Max. Deceleration 3 m/s
Channel bandwidth 10 MHz
OBU receiver sensitivity -82.0dBm
OBU antenna height 1m
Type of antenna Omnidirectional
Table 3: Car Prole.
4.2.1. Anonymity
Let us dene a new metric, named anonymity as the
probability that the a given attacker could not guess the
originator of the CSI query, i.e., the attackers guess of the
source node (S^) does not match the actual source node
(S) :
anonymity = ProbfS^ 6= Sg = N   1  p(N   c  2)
N   1 + p
(7)
where N is the number of neighbors of the sender node,
c is the number of malicious nodes and p is the forwarding
probability.
Figure 8: Anonymity vs. mean number of hops
As shown in g. 8 the anonymity increases with the
number of hops involved in the probabilistic routing. In
other words, with higher density of vehicles more vehicles
are involved in the forwarding of the non-invalidity proofs.
Thus, when more vehicles are present in the network it
becomes more probable to have higher number of hops
and hence more anonymity. Obviously, if we use a single
hop routing to get the non-invalidity proof, the requesting
vehicle is not longer anonymous. It is also worth noting
that some packet are lost and thus, EPA's does not reach
the theoretical maximum anonymity.
4.2.2. End-to-end Delay
To further evaluate EPA, we analyze the end-to-end
delay, which is dened as the time to transmit a message
from the sender to the receiver. That is, it includes not
only the transmission time of the message, but also the
time to authenticate the message. In EPA, authenticating
a message consists in verifying the validity of the signature
and checking that the corresponding certicates have not
been revoked.
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Figure 9: EPA end-to-end delay vs vehicle's speed, for dierent prob-
abilities of the anonymous protocol.
Figure 9 shows the end-to-end delay in milliseconds
vs. the vehicle's speed, by employing authentication us-
ing EPA. In the simulation, we consider 30,000 revoked
certicates and a message payload of 10 bytes. It can be
seen that the end-to-end delay decreases with the speed
because the number of the received packets decreases (as
well as the OBUs density) resulting in shorter waiting time
for the packets to be processed by the application layer in
each OBU. It can be seen that the end-to-end delay the
end-to-end delay tends to be constant no matter the vehi-
cle speed. This is mainly due to the existence of high OBUs
densities and the number of received packets reaches the
maximum number of packets an OBU can verify within
a specic duration. However, as expected, the delay in-
creases with the increase of the probability of forwarding
the no-invalidity proof request to other entities rather than
to the closest RSU. Note that with p = 1 means that all
the proof request are directly forward to the RSU, which
compromises the anonymity of the vehicle but achieves the
minimum delay. In any case, the end-to-end delay is below
the 110 ms, which allows to rapidly checking the status of
a given certicate, while downloading a CRL containing
the IDs of 30,000 revoked certicates could take minutes.
4.2.3. Message Loss Ratio
According to DSRC, each vehicle should disseminate
a trac message every 300 ms. The average message loss
ratio is dened as the average ratio between the number
of messages dropped every 300 ms, due to the message
certicate status checking delay, and the total number of
messages received every 300 ms by an OBU. Figure 10
shows the simulated message loss ratios every 300 ms for
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several certicate status checking mechanisms. It can be
seen that ADOPT performs the best due to the lowest
authentication overhead, and the performance of EPA is
almost close to ADOPT. At the initial stage of simulation,
the vehicles in ECPP and DCS have no idea on which cer-
ticates are veritable and have to verify both of the certi-
cate and the message signature for the received messages.
They cannot aord so much overhead, and some messages
will be dropped. In ECPP, as the number of veried cer-
ticates increases in the following stages of simulation, the
message verication overhead is only contingent upon the
signature verication. Because the certicate verication
cost is high in DCS, the message lost ratios in them do not
monotonously decrease. Moreover, we can observe that
DCS also does not work well because batch verication is
not ecient once the fake messages exist.
Similarly, under IEEE 16909.2, vehicles using CRLs
have no idea on which certicates are veritable and have
to verify both of the certicate and the message signature
for the received messages. They have to download the
whole CRL but they cannot aord so much overhead, and
some messages are dropped. Thus, the message loss ratio
is large at the beginning and decreases during the running
of the simulation. EPA does not present this transient
state during the initialization phase as the Digest can be
downloaded in milliseconds.
5. Conclusions
We have proposed EPA for VANETs, which enhances
the certicate status checking process by replacing the
time-consuming CRL with a fast revocation checking pro-
cess employing a Merkle Hash Tree. EPA not only satises
the security and privacy requirements of VANETs but can
also signicantly reduce the revocation cost. Moreover,
EPA enhances the driver's privacy so that the adversaries
cannot trace the communication of legitimate vehicles, al-
though they have compromised the RSUs. Taking advan-
tage of an anonymous protocol, vehicles do not have to
contact directly the RSU during the revocation service. In
contrast, our anonymous no-invalidity proof querying pro-
tocol depends on a forwarding probability that determines
whether the next query is forwarded to a random neigh-
bor, for better anonymity, or the query is sent directly to
the RSU, for minimum delay.
Analytic results show that allocating a small band-
width is enough to ensure that vehicles can download fresh
revocation information within few milliseconds. The per-
formance improvement is obtained at expenses of using
positive certicate status information, where vehicles have
to obtain a proof of the certicate's no-invalidity prior to
validate its status. Therefore, EPA signicantly reduces
the complexity of certicate management and achieves great
eciency and scalability, even when it is deployed in ve-
hicular networks.
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